Is pure r-selection really selection?

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):195 (1999)
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Lennox and Wilson (1994) critique dispositional accounts of selection on the grounds that such accounts will class evolutionary events as cases of selection whether or not the environment constrains population growth. Lennox and Wilson claim that pure r-selection involves no environmental checks on growth, and that accounts of natural selection ought to distinguish between the two sorts of cases. I argue that Lennox and Wilson are mistaken in claiming that pure r-selection involves no environmental checks, but suggest that two related cases support their substantive complaint, namely that dispositional accounts of selection have resources insufficient for making important distinctions in causal structure



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Bruce Glymour
Kansas State University

References found in this work

Chance and natural selection.John Beatty - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):183-211.
Natural selection and the struggle for existence.James G. Lennox & Bradley E. Wilson - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):65-80.
Contrastive, non-probabilistic statistical explanations.Bruce Glymour - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (3):448-471.

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