Authors
Luke Fenton-Glynn
University College London
Abstract
I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp020
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
The Direction of Time.Hans Reichenbach - 1956 - Dover Publications.
Time and Chance.David Z. Albert - 2000 - Harvard University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis.Daniel Hoek - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):639-60.
Emergent Chance.Christian List & Marcus Pivato - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):119-152.

View all 64 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities?Marc Lange - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.
Laws, Chances, and Statistical Mechanics.Eric Winsberg - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (4):872.
Determinism and Chance From a Humean Perspective.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2010 - In Friedrich Stadler, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao González, Hartmann J., Uebel Stephan, Weber Thomas & Marcel (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 351--72.
What Chances Could Not Be.Jenann Ismael - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):79-91.
David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance.Barry Loewer - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-05-12

Total views
1,078 ( #5,479 of 2,499,375 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #62,927 of 2,499,375 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes