Abstract

This dissertation begins with the argument that a preferred way of doing metaphysics is through philosophy of physics. An understanding of quantum physics is vital to answering questions such as: What counts as an individual object in physical ontology? Is the universe fundamentally indeterministic? Are indiscernibles identical? This study explores how the various modal interpretations of quantum mechanics answer these sorts of questions; modal accounts are one of the two classes of interpretations along with so-called collapse accounts. This study suggests a new alternative within the class of modal views that yields a more plausible ontology, one in which the Principle of the Identity of Indisceribles is necessarily true. Next, it shows that modal interpretations can consistently deny that the universe must be fundamentally indeterministic so long as they accept certain other metaphysical commitments: either a perfect initial distribution of states in the universe or some form of primitive dispositional properties. Finally, the study sketches out a future research project for modal interpretations based on developing quantified quantum logic