Concepts, abilities, and propositions

Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):115-134 (2010)
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Abstract

This article investigates whether the concept of a concept can be given a fairly uniform explanation through a 'cognitivist' account, one that accepts that concepts exist independently of individual subjects, yet nonetheless invokes mental achievements and capacities. I consider various variants of such an account, which identify a concept, respectively, with a certain kind of abilitiy, rule and way of thinking. All of them are confronted with what I call the 'proposition problem', namely that unlike these explananda concepts are standardly regarded as components of propositions. The paper ends by suggesting that this problem can be resolved by recognizing the different ways in which concepts can be involved in judgements or propositions, and by undermining the building-block model of concepts as abstract parts of abstract wholes

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Hans-Johann Glock
University of Zürich

Citations of this work

Can Animals Act For Reasons?Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):232-254.
Analysis, Explication, and the Nature of Concepts.Frauke Albersmeier - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):180-201.

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