Justification and the right to believe

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):532-544 (2010)


Some philosophers have attempted to utilize the conceptual tools of ethics in order to understand epistemology. One instantiation of this understands justification in terms of having a certain kind of epistemic right, namely, a right to believe. In variations of this theme, some hold that justification involves having the authority to believe, or being entitled to believe. But by examining the putative analogies between different versions of rights and justification, I demonstrate that justification should not be understood as having a right to believe

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Jeffrey Glick
Texas A&M University - Kingsville

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