The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen: Discussions

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Mind 119 (475):757-761 (2010)
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Abstract

We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.

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10.1093/mind/fzq061

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Author Profiles

Asa Maria Wikforss
Stockholm University
Kathrin Glüer
Stockholm University

Citations of this work

Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.
Unfollowed Rules and the Normativity of Content.Eric V. Tracy - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):323-344.
Reasons for Belief in Context.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.

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