Problems with Priors in Probabilistic Measures of Coherence

Erkenntnis 63 (3):375-385 (2005)
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Abstract

Two of the probabilistic measures of coherence discussed in this paper take probabilistic dependence into account and so depend on prior probabilities in a fundamental way. An example is given which suggests that this prior-dependence can lead to potential problems. Another coherence measure is shown to be independent of prior probabilities in a clearly defined sense and consequently is able to avoid such problems. The issue of prior-dependence is linked to the fact that the first two measures can be understood as measures of coherence as striking agreement, while the third measure represents coherence as agreement. Thus, prior (in)dependence can be used to distinguish different conceptions of coherence.

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David H. Glass
University of Ulster

Citations of this work

New Hope for Shogenji's Coherence Measure.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):125-142.
Coherence, Explanation, and Hypothesis Selection.David H. Glass - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):1-26.

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References found in this work

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338–345.
A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence.B. Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194-199.

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