Abstract

This dissertation attempts to defend the claim that there are intelligible bases for distinguishing between conceptual schemes, contrary to the position argued for by Donald Davidson in his essay "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." It aims as well to demonstrate that attempting to satisfy Davidson's methodological constraints upon interpreting the speech, thought and behavior of other peoples might result in serious interpretive misunderstandings. ;The dissertation begins with a consideration of Davidson's overall argument against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes, and tries to show that his characterization of what a conceptual scheme amounts to is unduly narrow. The first chapter also characterizes Davidson's "principle of charity," which he claims must govern the process of interpretation. It is shown here and in the second chapter that even when his methodological restrictions are followed to the greatest possible extent, genuine cases of untranslatable expressions and incommensurable concepts remain that constitute a basis for differentiating between conceptual schemes. Some of these differences are shown to result from interests different from those of the translator or interpreter. ;The third chapter examines restrictions on belief-attribution as recommended by Davidson's principle of charity, and demonstrates contrary to his methodological proposals that fundamental differences in basic beliefs exist. These difference in basic beliefs partially characterize alternative conceptual schemes and serve as a basis for differentiating between them. The fourth chapter examines the foundations of interpretive charity, and argues that the pluralistic nature of a modern interpreter's intellectual background precludes the easy attribution of a distinctive set of beliefs, concepts or criteria of rational justification. It is argued here that the principle of charity, when properly understood, presupposes the intelligibility of the idea of alternative conceptual schemes. ;The final chapter considers Davidson's arguments against the subjective-objective dichotomy he claims characterizes recent philosophy. Here it is argued, in opposition to Davidson, that ethnographic data concerning the phenomenological lives of some peoples provides a further basis for differentiating between conceptual schemes