Can a restrictive definition lead to biases and tautologies?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):411-412 (2007)
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Abstract

We argue that the operational definition proposed by Ramsey et al. does not represent a significant improvement for students of innovation, because it is so restrictive that it might actually prevent the testing of hypotheses on the relationships between innovation, ecology, evolution, culture, and intelligence. To avoid tautological thinking, we need to use an operational definition that is taxonomically unbiased and neutral with respect to the hypotheses to be tested

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Citations of this work

A property cluster theory of cognition.Cameron Buckner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-30.
A property cluster theory of cognition.Cameron Buckner - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):307-336.

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