Abstract

This dissertation investigates various theoretical defenses or explanations which have been provided to the classic philosophic question: what are the objects of perception? Traditionally two general answers have been provided: direct and indirect realism. Direct realists maintain that the objects of perception are external, medium sized material objects. The arguments from illusion and secondary qualities are thought to provide counterexamples to this common sense approach. Indirect realism has grown out of the perceived difficulty posed by illusions and secondary qualities. According to this view the objects of perception are not material objects but rather simple, mind dependent representations. ;Any adequate theoretical defense of a particular type of object which is to serve as the basic object of perception must explain how that object forms the basis of content for all perception. In addition, the defense must justify our belief that vision provides objective knowledge about the world. The first defense of indirect realism I investigate is the so called Lockean veil of perception doctrine. According to this doctrine, visual representations are literally composed of similarity relations between simple completely known representations. The second defense of indirect realism I discuss grows out of Fred Dretske's doctrine of nonepistemic seeing and its accompanying existence condition. Finally I argue that the existence condition is not strong enough to serve as the basis of all perceptual content. I argue that any adequate theory of the objects of perception must involve at least minimal conceptual contact with those objects. Nevertheless the direct realism I defend does not deny the role of purely subjective representation. I advocate using the neo-Fregean notion of object dependent senses to identify the most direct objects of perception. These representations directly relate perceivers to objects without themselves being objects of perception. Further these representations presuppose simple conceptual requirements which must be possessed by all perceivers.