The non-consequentialist moral force of promises: a response to Sinnott-Armstrong

Analysis 72 (3):506-513 (2012)
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Michael B. Gill
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Promises.Allen Habib - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Consequentialism and Promises.Alida Liberman - 2020 - In Douglas Portmore (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. pp. 289 - 309.

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References found in this work

An argument for consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:399-421.
Autonomy and benevolent lies.Thomas E. Hill - 1984 - Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (4):251-267.

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