Abstract

This article aims to provide an account of the relationship between transcendental claims and the project of using transcendental argumentation that differs from the mainstream literature. In much of the literature, such claims are said to have as their primary value the overcoming of various sceptical positions. The author argues that, whilst transcendental arguments may be narrowly characterised as anti-sceptical, transcendental claims do not have to be used in only this way, and in fact can be useful in several areas of philosophy outside the issue of scepticism, and so can be used by transcendental arguments more broadly conceived. The author offers four examples of transcendental claims that are not used in narrow, anti-sceptical transcendental arguments. The author argues that these broader arguments use transcendental claims but not in an anti-sceptical way. From this, the author concludes that given the well-known difficulties transcendental arguments in this narrow sense seem to have had in defeating scepticism, distinguishing narrow transcendental arguments clearly from transcendental claims as such in this manner can provide a way for the latter to still serve an important role in philosophy, by showing how such claims can be used more broadly, regardless of any doubts one may have about the anti-sceptical value of such claims.