Kants ethischer Kohärentismus

Kant Studien 107 (4):651-680 (2016)
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Abstract

In ethics, deductivism strives for self-evident premises as a foundation for normative claims, whereas coherentism seeks moral justification in relations between abstract normative claims and moral judgments. While Immanuel Kant is still widely believed to have pursued a deductivist project, the article contends that he endeavored to justify his moral philosophy in general as well as the Categorical Imperative in particular in the coherentist manner that has later on been advocated by John Rawls. First, the characteristics of Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium are summarized and traced within Kant’s writings. The resulting coherentist interpretation is then defended against the opposing view that Kant’s appeal to the ‘fact of reason’ proves his adherence to ethical intuitionism.

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Jens Gillessen
University of Marburg

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