Compatibilist freedom and the problem of evil

Leuven: Peeters (2018)
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Abstract

Compatibilism has become an increasingly popular position amongst contemporary philosophers. However, within the philosophy of religion the majority of philosophers continue to adopt an incompatibilist, usually libertarian, view of free will. This book seeks to explore whether it is possible to formulate a coherent compatibilist response to the problem of evil and, if so, whether such a response could help compatibilism to be seen as a viable, or even preferable, alternative to incompatibilism within philosophy of religion."--Back cover.

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