Are There Background Beliefs?

In José María Ariso & Astrid Wagner (eds.), Rationality Reconsidered: Ortega y Gasset and Wittgenstein on Knowledge, Belief, and Practice. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 119-124 (2016)
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10.1515/9783110454413-009

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Thomas Gil
Technische Universität Berlin

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