A Problem About Preference

Philosophers' Imprint 21 (19) (2021)
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Abstract

Obligation describing language is hooked up with preference, a relation of what-is-better-than-what. But ordinary situations underdetermine such relations of what-is-better-than-what. Even so, there are plainly true sentences describing our obligations in those situations. This mismatch is trouble-making and getting out of the trouble requires either giving up the easy link between “ought” and preference or re-thinking the kind of things preferences can be.

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Anthony Gillies
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

On preferring.Kyle Blumberg - 2022 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1315-1344.

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