Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):409-410 (2001)
Abstract |
I argue that (1) the accusation that psychological methods are too diverse conflates “reliability” with “validity”; (2) one must not choose methods by the results they produce – what matters is whether a method acceptably models the real-world situation one is trying to understand; (3) one must also distinguish methodological failings from differences that arise from the pursuit of different theoretical questions.
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DOI | 10.1017/s0140525x0129414x |
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