Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Goodness, rational permissibility, and the like might be gruesome properties. That is to say, they might not well suit causal-explanatory purposes. Or at least, these properties are gruesome for all their normative concepts tell us by themselves. Perhaps hedonists are right and such properties are anything but gruesome, but perhaps instead, the most gruesome-minded ethical pluralists are right—normative concepts by themselves don’t settle the issue. At the end of his marvelous commentary, John Hawthorne depicts the morass of dank possibilities that a “moral realist” must enter when he tries explaining how normative words and thoughts could lock on to some particular causally gruesome property that constitutes being good. Right, I say, and expressivists can direct us around the morass. Then he asks why I avoid the questions that lead moral realists into this morass. But I don’t avoid them; I offer an answer.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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Reprint years 2010
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00150.x
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Normative Properties.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (s):141-157.

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