Rational Credence and the Value of Truth

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:143-164 (2008)
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Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.

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