Predisposing the Decision Maker Versus Framing the Decision: A Consumer-Manipulation Approach to Dynamic Preference

Marketing 8 (1):71-83 (1997)
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Abstract

The dominant approach to the study of dynamic preference is to generate preference change by manipulating aspects of decision-problem presentation (problem description, task procedure, contextual options). The predisposing approach instead manipulates the decision maker’s mental state while holding problem presentation constant. Three illustrative studies are outlined here. The first modified preferences for ambitious consumption by manipulating subjects’ consumption energy. The second modified preferences for immediate consumption by manipulating subjects’ hedonic resources. The third modified preferences for consumption itself by manipulating subjects’ desire proneness. Whereas framing is thought to affect perception, predisposing apparently can affect tastes and so involves a special kind of preference dynamism.

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Brian J. Gibbs
University of Chicago (PhD)

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References found in this work

.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Choices, Values, and Frames.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Predictive utility.D. Kahneman & J. Snell - 1990 - In L. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research. Guilford Press. pp. 66--100.

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