Normative and Recognitional Concepts

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things considered” ought that I can use in my thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of what to do.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Normative and recognitional concepts.Allan Gibbard - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167.
Phenomenal concepts: Neither circular nor opaque. E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1186-1199.
The notion of a recognitional concept and other confusions.Malte Dahlgrün - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160.
Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument.Erhan Demircioglu - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):325-340.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-16

Downloads
20 (#723,940)

6 months
6 (#431,022)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Disagreement.Mike Ridge - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):41-63.
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
The metaethicists' mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.
Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.

View all 12 references / Add more references