Normative and Recognitional Concepts

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167 (2002)
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Abstract

I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things considered” ought that I can use in my thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of what to do.

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original Gibbard, Allan (2002) "Normative and recognitional concepts". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(1):151-167

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Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on moral realism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.

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