Normative and recognitional concepts

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):151-167 (2002)
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Abstract

I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things considered” ought that I can use in my thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of what to do.

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Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment.Alisabeth Ayars - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):42-61.
Disagreement.Mike Ridge - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):41-63.
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
The metaethicists' mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.

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References found in this work

Principia ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Essays in quasi-realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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