Authors
Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
I can ask myself what to do, and I can ask myself what I ought to do. Are these the same question? We can imagine conjuring up a distinction, I’m sure. Suppose, though, I just told you this: “I have figured out what I ought to do, and I have figured out what to do.” Would you understand immediately what distinction I was making? To do so, you would have to exercise ingenuity. I have in mind here an “all things considered” ought that I can use in my thinking, an ought that is not specifically moral, in that it doesn’t settle by sheer rules of language that I ought always to abide by morality. For this ought, the question of what I ought to do seems just to be the question of what to do.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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Reprint years 2010
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00148.x
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Disagreement.Mike Ridge - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):41-63.
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
The Metaethicists' Mistake.Ralph Wedgwood - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):405–426.

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