Kant's theory of imagination: bridging gaps in judgement and experience

New York: Oxford University Press (1994)
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Abstract

This book departs from much of the scholarship on Kant by demonstrating the centrality of imagination to Kant's philosophy as a whole. In Kant's works, human experience is simultaneously passive and active, thought and sensed, free and unfree: these dualisms are often thought of as unfortunate byproducts of his system. Gibbons, however, shows that imagination performs a vital function in "bridging gaps" between the different elements of cognition and experience. Thus, the role imagination plays in Kant's works expresses his fundamental insight into the complexity of cognition for finite rational beings such as ourselves.

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Citations of this work

Beauty in Proofs: Kant on Aesthetics in Mathematics.Angela Breitenbach - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):955-977.
Kant's Subjective Deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
Cognitive Interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Aesthetic ideas.Mojca Kuplen - 2019 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 56 (12):48-64.

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