Junky Non-Worlds

Erkenntnis 80 (2):437-443 (2015)
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Abstract

A mereological structure is junky if and only if each of its elements is a proper part of some other. The young literature on junk has focused on junky worlds and whether they are counterexamples to unrestricted composition. The present note defends the possibility of junky structures that are not worlds. This possibility complicates a recent attempt in the literature to render junk consistent with a weakened form of unrestricted composition. The upshot is that junky non-worlds threaten the weakened form of unrestricted composition as much as junky worlds threaten the traditional version

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Daniel Giberman
University of Gothenburg

Citations of this work

Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A topological theory of fundamental concrete particulars.Daniel Giberman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2679-2704.
Prioritizing platonism.Kelly Trogdon & Sam Cowling - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2029-2042.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.

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