Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion

Erkenntnis 71 (2):205-221 (2009)
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Abstract

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism.

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Sophie Gibb
Durham University

Citations of this work

Explanatory Exclusion and Mental Explanation.Dwayne Moore - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):390-404.
Dispositional Explanations in Dualism.Janko Nesic - 2013 - Filozofija I Društvo 24 (4):218-241.

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.

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