In C. Boutilier & M. Goldszmidt (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 16. Morgan Kaufmann (2000)

Abstract
In this paper, we formulate a qualitative “linear” utility theory for lotteries in which uncertainty is expressed qualitatively using a Spohnian disbelief function. We argue that a rational decision maker facing an uncertain decision problem in which the uncertainty is expressed qualitatively should behave so as to maximize “qualitative expected utility.” Our axiomatization of the qualitative utility is similar to the axiomatization developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern for probabilistic lotteries. We compare our results with other recent results in qualitative decision making.
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Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2008 - Dordrecht and Heidelberg: Springer.
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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