Abstract

This paper wishes to look into the relationship between J. L.Austin’s methodological notion of linguistic phenomenology and continental phenomenology. Austin himself did not offer an explicit elaboration or examination of linguistic phenomenology; nor did he follow its implication and significance for phenomenology practiced in the continent. However, a number of philosophers have argued that Austin’s methodology has important bearing for continental phenomenology, specifically, Husserl’s version of it. Austin was not simply calling attention to the utility of drawing fine distinctions in ordinary language, he was also recommending an examination of what we should say when; what words should we use in what situations. For him, the distinctions discernible in language mark distinctions in the world. Austin’s proposal to prise off words from the world and to look at them without linguistic blinkers has been compared to Husserl’s epoché. His repeated reference to ‘context’ and ‘situation’ is understood as concerned not only with words but also with the phenomena of everyday life – the concrete life-world in Husserl’s terminology. This paper does not intend to overlook the distinctions between the two ways of doing philosophy. Rather it considers it rewarding to interpret Austin’s suggestions as affording a bridge between Anglo-American linguistic philosophy and continental phenomenology.