Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Philosophical Issues 30 (1):132-147 (2020)
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Abstract

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks-related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.

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Harmen Ghijsen
Radboud University Nijmegen

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References found in this work

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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