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Teleological reasoning in infancy: The infant's naive theory of rational action
Cognition 63 (2):227-233 (1997)
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Citations of this work
Action understanding as inverse planning.Chris L. Baker, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2009 - Cognition 113 (3):329-349.
Goal attribution without agency cues: the perception of ‘pure reason’ in infancy.Gergely Csibra, György Gergely, Szilvia Bı́ró, Orsolya Koós & Margaret Brockbank - 1999 - Cognition 72 (3):237-267.
Constructing an understanding of mind: The development of children's social understanding within social interaction.Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):79-96.
Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants.Gergely Csibra - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):705-717.
One‐year‐old infants use teleological representations of actions productively.Gergely Csibra, Szilvia Bíró, Orsolya Koós & György Gergely - 2003 - Cognitive Science 27 (1):111-133.
References found in this work
Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age.György Gergely, Zoltán Nádasdy, Gergely Csibra & Szilvia Bíró - 1995 - Cognition 56 (2):165-193.
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