The Norms of Cognitive Development

Mind and Language 13 (1):56-75 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Once the notion of a precursive relationship between developmental stages is fully articulated in terms of the distinction between ‘role’ and ‘realiser’ states, it turns out that the ‘Theory of Mind’ literature operates with a notion of precursive relationships described at too high a level of abstraction to explain actual mechanisms of development. Furthermore, the tendency within that literature to explain precursive relationships in terms of role states with isomorphic linguistic/computational structures is misleading. Developmental relationships are more likely to exist between states which play a similar normative role in the agents’s psychology than between states which can be described as sharing a similar computational architecture.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The norms of cognitive development.Philip Gerrans - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (1):56-75.
Individualism and cognitive development.Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):107-108.
Language and the Development of Cognitive Control.Lucy Cragg & Kate Nation - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):631-642.
The Human Nature of the Economic Mind.Katherine Nelson - 2011 - Biological Theory 6 (4):377-387.
Norms in Human Development.Leslie Smith & Jacques Vonèche (eds.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-23

Downloads
5 (#1,514,558)

6 months
1 (#1,516,429)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Philip Gerrans
University of Adelaide

Citations of this work

The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (3):305-321.
Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology?Valentine Reynaud - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiae 18:177-190.
La lecture de pensée pour débutants.Philip Gerrans - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):125-145.
Can Innateness Ascriptions Avoid Tautology?Valentine Reynaud - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiae 18:177-190.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references