The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional Thought

MIT Press (2014)
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Abstract

Drawing on the latest work in cognitive neuroscience, a philosopher proposes that delusions are narrative models that accommodate anomalous experiences.

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Philip Gerrans
University of Adelaide

Citations of this work

The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.
Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Thought insertion without thought.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding.Philip Gerrans - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):401-418.

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