Abstract

Michael Joseph Oakeshott was a political philosopher better known for his conservative politics than his philosophy. Yet his philosophical background inspires current interpreters of his work. Some have rediscovered Oakeshott's idealism, connecting his work to that of G. W. F. Hegel. While recognizing the importance of Hegel for Oakeshott, I emphasize the skeptical character of Oakeshott's thought and his connections to Thomas Hobbes. I contend that attention to Oakeshott's philosophical skepticism provides an understanding of the connections between his philosophy and politics, and makes it possible to bring his skepticism to questions in contemporary democratic theory. ;I first examine Oakeshott's idealist heritage, however I then survey changes in Oakeshott's thought that reveal a rejection of his early idealism. I next study Oakeshott's political thought during that early stage, establishing a position which contrasts to his later skeptical thought. I then examine Oakeshott's interpretation of Hobbes. I argue that Oakeshott's attention to Hobbes discloses his own increasing skepticism and also that Oakeshott's later political thought reflects his interpretation of Hobbes. ;Oakeshott manifests his association with Hobbes in his use, analysis and advocacy of the concept of civil association, Oakeshott's ideal for the modern state. Oakeshott is attracted to this model because he supposes it can maintain authority while requiring a grounding neither in universal natural law or right nor in consensus about common purpose; none of these passes Oakeshott's skepticism. ;I suggest that Oakeshott's own concept of authority in civil association needs to be subject to greater skepticism than he offers; I argue that his own conception of authority requires a consensus that he elsewhere denies. Oakeshott reins in his skepticism by not extending it to the authority of civil association. Doing so would involve examining the plurality of beliefs about authority, asking whose beliefs get recognized by the state, and exploring how the state generates and reproduces authoritative beliefs. I conclude that is it is to these questions, central to contemporary democratic theory, that Oakeshott's skepticism speaks