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Introduction: Is cognitive penetrability the mark of the moral?

Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett

Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):3 – 12 (2006) Copy BIBT_EX

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Jeanette Kennett

Macquarie University

University of Adelaide

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Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability in Philosophy of Mind

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10.1080/13869790500492284

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Author Profiles

Jeanette Kennett

Macquarie University

University of Adelaide

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Morally irrelevant factors: What's left of the dual process-model of moral cognition?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):783-811.

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Sim and the city: Rationalism in psychology and philosophy and Haidt's account of moral judgment.Steve Clarke - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):799 – 820.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.

The Moral Problem.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):508-515.

Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.

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