Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind

Noûs 36 (1):22-49 (2002)
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Abstract

My aim here is threefold: to show that conceptual facts play a more significant role in justifying explanatory reductions than most of the contributors to the current debate realize; to furnish an account of that role, and to trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind

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Brie Gertler
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

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