The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies

Philosophical Studies 124 (3):331-352 (2005)
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Perhaps the concept of knowledge, prior to its being fashioned and molded by certain philosophical traditions, never offered any stable negative verdict in the original fake barn case.



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Author Profiles

John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University
Tamar Gendler
Yale University

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