Continental Philosophy Review 47 (1):1-17 (2014)

Saulius Geniusas
Chinese University of Hong Kong
The following investigation aims to determine the historical origins of the phenomenology of pain. According to my central thesis, these origins can be traced back to an enthralling discussion between Husserl and two of his most important teachers, Brentano and Stumpf. According to my reconstruction of this discussion, while Brentano defended the view that all feelings, including pain, are intentional experiences, and while Stumpf argued that pain is a non-intentional feeling-sensation, Husserl of the Logical Investigations provides compelling resources to resolve the polemic between his teachers by showing how pain can be conceived as a pre-intentional experience. According to my argument, this largely forgotten discussion is of significance not only because it enriches our understanding of pain, but also because it modifies the phenomenological conception of consciousness. Thus in the concluding section, I show why the Husserlian resolution of the controversy between Brentano and Stumpf is of importance for our understanding of the central phenomenological theme—intentionality
Keywords Phenomenology  Descriptive psychology  Pain  Feeling-sensations  Emotions
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11007-014-9283-3
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,130
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Logische Untersuchungen.Edmund Husserl (ed.) - 1900 - Felix Meiner Verlag.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Phenomenology of Chronic Pain: Embodiment and Alienation.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2015 - Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):107-122.
The Inner Tension of Pain and the Phenomenology of Evil.Espen Dahl - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (4-5):396-406.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Philosophy of Brentano.Linda L. McAlister (ed.) - 1976 - Humanities Press.
Do Animals Feel Pain?Peter Singer - 1990 - In Peter. Singer (ed.), Animal Liberation. Avon Books.
Phenomenology and Intentional Acts of Sensing in Brentano.Lynn Pasquerella - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):269-279.
The Intentionality of Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 307-337.
Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain.Murat Aydede - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
Pain's Evils.Adam Swenson - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):197-216.
The Feeling of Pain and the Emotion of Distress.Eric A. Salzen - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):471-471.
Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality.James C. Morrison - 1970 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1):27-46.


Added to PP index

Total views
89 ( #130,974 of 2,506,405 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,997 of 2,506,405 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes