Philosophical Studies 49 (1):83 - 98 (1986)

Harry Gensler
Loyola University, Chicago
I criticize various anti- and pro-abortion arguments. then, using the principle that a consistent person who thinks it permissible to do a to another will also consent to the idea of someone doing a to him in similar circumstances, i argue that most people could not consistently hold that abortion is normally permissible. i discuss possible objections and distinguish my view from hare's
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372407
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On a Kantian Argument Against Abortion.Bryan Wilson - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (1):119 - 130.
Personhood, Vagueness and Abortion.Justin Mcbrayer - 2007 - Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 9 (1).

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