Alief in Action (and Reaction)

Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Why Alief is Not a Legitimate Psychological Category.Hans Muller & Bana Bashour - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:371-389.
How can you be surprised? The case for volatile expectations.Roberto Casati & Elena Pasquinelli - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):171-183.
Belief and pretense: A reply to Gendler.Martijn Blaauw - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):204-209.
Imagination and other scripts.Eric Funkhouser & Shannon Spaulding - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.
The product of self-deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):774-788.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
799 (#18,392)

6 months
38 (#95,006)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tamar Gendler
Yale University

Citations of this work

Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements.Sally Haslanger - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):1-22.
Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On the epistemic costs of implicit bias.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):33-63.

View all 146 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books.
The expression of the emotions in man and animal.Charles Darwin - 1898 - Mineola, New York: Dover Publications.

View all 90 references / Add more references