Belief as a non-epistemic adaptive benefit

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43 (2020)
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Abstract

Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their epistemic truth value, such as group cohesion and identity. A model of resource-rational cognition that accounts for these benefits may explain unexpected and seemingly irrational thought patterns, such as belief polarization.

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10.1017/s0140525x19002206

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Citations of this work

An Ethics of Philosophical Belief: The case for personal commitments.Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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