Kant-Studien 112 (4):551-593 (2021)

This paper focuses on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s models of self-consciousness and their specific relation to time. It aims to show that genuine philosophical theories can explain the idiosyncratic relation between ourselves and the world without relying on pure metaphysical speculations or strictly empirical and phenomenally oriented conceptions, as many contemporary proponents of analytic philosophy entail. The first groundbreaking doctrine in this regard is Kant’s transcendental theory of apperception, which unfolds a new theoretical dimension of thinking, grounding the logical unity of thought in the pure, originally synthetic unity of the subject itself. In order to constitute a structural order within the appearing phenomenal world, Kant conceptualizes a theory of self-affection in the second edition of the Critique of pure reason, positing a dynamic relation between the spontaneously acting intellect and the purely receptive inner sense of time as a result of productive transcendental imagination. The problematic relation between self-reliance and empirical consciousness that Kant did not resolve completely led to various subsequent transformations of Kant’s transcendental principles, one of which boasts Schopenhauer as a prominent but rarely considered representative. Schopenhauer’s systematic approach consists in a modified version of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which ties the Kantian subject of logical and transcendental unity to an intuitive corporeal individual that can only conceptualize itself as an original, willing subject. The Schopenhauerian subject unfolds its empirical character in accordance with its own inner impulses and motivations, which manifest themselves in time but can only be interpreted as a phenomenal representation of a higher, metaphysical unity, which Schopenhauer calls the will as a thing in itself. Schopenhauer reaches his final metaphysical conclusion via a problematic analogy, positing another perspective on the corporeal nature of the individual which, by means of abstraction, can be extended to the whole phenomenal world. Therefore, Schopenhauer interprets the underlying character of the subject and the phenomenal world as a whole as a timeless, omnipresent will to live which can be temporally experienced within the nature of our own subjectivity.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/kant-2021-0029
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,579
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deleuze and Schopenhauer.Alistair Welchman - 2015 - In Craig Lundy & Daniella Voss (eds.), At the Edges of Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy. Edinburgh, UK: pp. 213-252.
Schopenhauer and Kant.Peter Welsen - 2005 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 61 (3):757-772.
Schopenhauer's Critique of Kantian Ethics.Julian Young - 1984 - Kant-Studien 75 (1-4):191-212.
Schopenhauer’s Berkeleyan Strategy for Transcendental Idealism.Marco Segala - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (5):891-913.
Kant's Philosophy as Rectified by Schopenhauer.M. Kelly - 1910 - Philosophical Review 19 (1):93-94.


Added to PP index

Total views
3 ( #1,334,673 of 2,461,982 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,153 of 2,461,982 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes