Abstract

This book exemplifies how current linguistic theory may be applied to traditional philosophical problems. It gives a defense of a traditional theory of concepts by basing that defense on arguments that can be found in transformational linguistic theory for concepts as theoretical entities. Concepts are regarded by the author as abstract entities, as ideas which play a role in thinking, and as universals in the sense of "shared" properties of particulars. Chapter one surveys the results of recent transformationally based semantic theory, both in its Chomskyan and Generative Semantics forms, and identifies semantic markers and their structural interrelations as representing concepts. Chapter two is designed to analyze the structure of concepts both in their logical and grammatical form. The author assimilates concepts as semantic representations in linguistic theory to Frege’s notion of concepts and with this combination defends a concept of concept as the meaning of linguistic expressions which is predicative, transformational, and conceived of as a structure of concepts itself. Chapter three discusses the philosophical and psychological ramifications of this point of view. That chapter is mostly a philosophical critique of positions, particularly Quine’s, which argue against the existence and/or utility of concepts. The author also endeavors to make a case for the utilization of linguistics in the investigation of cognitive processes generally and in the concluding part of the chapter speaks briefly to the issue of reductionism.