Abstract

It is a common assumption that subjectivism, relativism and particularism hold true of aesthetic values, while many philosophers believe that moral values are, on the contrary, objective, absolute and that there is a decision-procedure for determining whether any particular action is morally required. According to these views, then, the two sets of values are radically distinct. I argue, however, that aesthetic values are objective and relative . I develop a theory of interpretation of art which provides premises for arguing for both of these claims. I also show that prima facie principles play a role in aesthetic evaluation. I then examine moral values and argue for the view that there is a plurality of moral principles and no decision-procedure to determine which should have priority when they clash. I also argue that moral values are objective and relative. The upshot of these arguments is to establish a surprising degree of structural similarity between the two evaluative areas. I offer some explanations for this symmetry and also show that there is a further close connection between the two sorts of evaluation, in that moral criticism of works of art is a legitimate part of aesthetic evaluation