Fictional Truth and Make-Believe

Philosophia 42 (2):349-361 (2014)
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Abstract

The statement “Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” seems true in Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice (even though it may not actually appear in the text) while the statement “Mr. Darcy is a detective” seems false. One explanation for this intuition is that when we read or talk about fictional stories, we implicitly employ the fictional operator “It is fictional that” or “It is part of the story that.” “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” expresses a true proposition while “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy is a detective” does not. Fictive statements can be abbreviated as “In F, P”. Determining what statements are fictionally true in a story requires providing truth conditions for statements of the form “In F, P.” This paper proposes an analysis of truth in fiction and examines the notion of make-believe

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Author Profiles

Dimitria Gatzia
University of Akron
Eric Sotnak
University of Akron

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References found in this work

The Nature of Fiction.Gregory Currie - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth in fiction.David K. Lewis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):37–46.
Foundations of Illocutionary Logic.John Rogers Searle & Daniel Vanderveken - 1985 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse.John R. Searle - 1975 - New Literary History 6 (2):319--32.

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