Abstract

Fynsk's book stands out against the three types of commentary that ordinarily prevail in Heidegger scholarship. If the emphasis has been either on the early versus the late Heidegger, on the later versus the Heidegger of Being and Time, or on the continuity and unity of the Heideggerian corpus of writings, then Fynsk's study, at first sight, is closest to the first of these approaches. But what clearly distinguishes his reading from such an approach is that while he stresses the unsurpassed originality of the analytics of Dasein, Fynsk does not merely elevate Heidegger's fundamental ontology to the status of an unproblematic source of authority. Rather, from within the terms of the problematic opened in the work before the Kehre, Fynsk seeks the conditions for a renewed questioning that repeats the thrust of the analytics of Dasein in order to determine the very limits of Heidegger's early enterprise--limits that could serve as a new point of departure for those theoretical possibilities that Heidegger himself left unexplored and unexploited. These limits are double; they represent the boundary lines between Heidegger's most radical thoughts and the space of metaphysics which continues to function in his work as a horizon of confinement.