Law and Philosophy 30 (1):1-50 (2011)

John Gardner
PhD: Oxford University
In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the ‘continuity thesis’ according to which at least part of the rationale for doing corrective justice is to mitigate one’s wrongs, including one’s torts. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. In the process I show (what I will discuss in a later companion paper) that ‘corrective justice’ cannot be a complete answer to the question of what tort law is for
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Political Science   Social Sciences, general   Law Theory/Law Philosophy   Philosophy of Law
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1007/s10982-010-9086-6
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References found in this work BETA

Personal Practical Conflicts.Joseph Raz - 2004 - In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 172--196.
The Obligation of Reparation.D. N. MacCormick - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78:175 - 193.

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Citations of this work BETA

Understanding Standing: Permission to Deflect Reasons.Ori Herstein - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3109-3132.
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Strict Moral Liability.Justin A. Capes - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):52-71.
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