Abstract

From a study of the grammar of discourse about good and bad things I argue that certain locutions frequently thought to contain ascriptions of 'intrinsic' value actually ascribe moral value to certain desires, intentions, and affections. I try to show that the relation between the good and the desirable, the bad and the undesirable, is not semantic but syntactical and sketch a logic of desiring or not desiring, intending or not intending, desirable, undesirable, or indifferent states of affairs. I argue that intention must be so understood that acts and effects are intended only if they are pursued as means or ends; the merely expected is not intended. Having identified the desirable with the morally good to desire, I develop a theory of moral value that construes being a good man morally with being good in some morally-determinative role and I claim that these are, roughly, those roles that, as a matter of human nature, we want someone to fill in our lives--e.g., friend or fellow man. This interpretation of moral discourse gives the best account of the centrality of the victim in the criticism of evil-doing, the etymology of moral words and the history of their use, the non-evidential character of moral knowledge, and the Golden Rule. It also enables us to abandon the fruitless advice-model of the moral 'ought' and substitute a model than better explains its supposed categoricalness. Following the lead of some deontic logicians, I analyze duty in terms of evil-doing, suggest a way of distinguishing it from supererogation, and present a categorization of moral action. I argue that one can violate the duty of benevolence by malevolence as well as by non-benevolence and that offenses of the first sort are worse. This doctrine, with the narrow interpretation of intent argued for earlier, serves to ground a moral absolutism that proscribes ever intending any undeserving man to suffer harm. I defend this absolutism against a host of recent criticisms by others within the analytical tradition. In an appendix, I apply the theory to some cases that have attracted attention within the last decade and develop accounts of desert, rights, rights-forfeiture, favoritism and equality that are at variance with conclusions reached by contemporary enthusiasts for abortion, euthanasia, eauality and so-called 'distributive justice'