Theoria 81 (3):222-248 (2015)
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| Abstract |
In this article I articulate two pairs of theses about the relationship between the right and the good and I sketch an account of morality that systematically vindicates all four theses, despite a nearly universal consensus that they are not all true. In the first half I elucidate and motivate the theses and explain why leading ethical theorists maintain that at least one of them is false; in the second half I present the outlines of an account of the relationship between the right and the good satisfying all four theses
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| Keywords | reasons obligation overridingness value |
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| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12065 |
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