The Limits of Virtue?: Replies to Carter and Goldberg

In Mark Alfano, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

My essay ‘Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention’ is the lead essay in a symposium. Adam Carter and Sandy Goldberg each respond to the ‘Attunement’ essay. This is my rejoinder. (i.) Carter argues that resources from virtue reliabilism can explain the source of attention normativity. He modifies this virtue reliabilist AAA-framework to apply to attentional normativity. I raise concerns about Carter’s project. I suggest that true belief and proper attentional habits are not relevantly similar. (ii.) Goldberg claims that social roles underwrite kinds of attentional normativity that are not well-captured by virtue theory. I critically assess this claim.

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