Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209 (1990)

Abstract
The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the intuitive link between intention and intentionally, and supports the common sense view that the concept of intending is more basic than those of acting with an intention and of acting intentionally. The remainder of the paper responds to certain apparent counter-examples offered by Audi, Harman, and Bratman. In the course of this, I discuss connections between intending to V and hoping to V, and I argue that one can intend to do what one doesn't expect to do, and that one always intends what one attempts.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00166332
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
Simply, False.Nucci Ezio Di - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):69 - 78.
Simply, False.E. Di Nucci - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):69-78.
Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy.Ryan Wasserman - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.

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