Supervenience physicalism: Meeting the demands of determination and explanation

Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208 (2005)
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Abstract

Abstract Non-reductive physicalism is currently the most widely held metaphysic of mind. My aim in this essay is to show that supervenience physicalism?perhaps the most common form of non-reductive physicalism?is not a defensible position. I argue that, in order for any supervenience thesis to ground a legitimate form of physicalism, it must yield the right sort of determination relation between physical and non-physical properties. Then I argue that non-reductionism leaves one without any explanation for the laws that are implied by supervenience theses that deliver this determination relation

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Citations of this work

Physicalism without supervenience.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1529-1544.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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